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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DuE PROCESS - PRICE-FIXING - A Nebraska
statute required the licensing of private employment agencies and limited maximum compensation for services rendered to ten per cent of the first month's
salary or wages of the person for whom employment was obtained. In this case
the Secretary of Labor of Nebraska refused to issue a license because of the
applicant's refusal to limit its compensation to the statutory maximum. In a
suit for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the issuing of the license, the
Secretary of Labor relied on the statute. In reliance on Ribnik 'll. McBride, 1
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u. s.

350, 48

s. Ct.

545 (1928).
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the Supreme Court of Nebraska, with one judge dissenting, held the statute
invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and ordered
the peremptory writ of mandamus to be issued.2 On certiorari, held that the
statute did not deny due process of law and the judgment of the state court
ordered reversed. Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Association, 313 U.S. 236, 61 S. Ct. 862 (1941).
In view of N ebbia v. New Y ork,3 the result in the principal case was hardly
a surprise. Ribnik v. McBride, now definitely overruled, was the source of dissent at the time it was decided:' In its blind reliance on Tyson & Brother v.
Banton,5 its emphasis on the verbal tests presented by such language as "dedicated
to a public use" and "affected with a public interest," its failure to distinguish
between public utility regulation and other regulation of a much less comprehensive type, its disregard of abuses practiced by uncontrolled employment
agencies, and its indication of a general hostility to all forms of price-fixing, the
opinion of the majority in the Ribnik case stood condemned even according to
conservative standards of judicial interpretation under the due process clause.
The N ebbia case reduced review in the name of due process to a scrutiny of the
reasonableness of the legislative ends to be achieved and a scrutiny of the reasonableness of the legislative means employed. Price-fixing was no longer objectionable per se. The N ebbia case seemed to restore the basic thought pattern of
Munn v. Illinois 6 by removing the accumulated gloss of subsequent restrictive
interpretation.7 After reviewing recent decisions upholding price-fixing legislation, Justice Douglas states the matter succinctly in the principal case: "These
cases represent more than scattered examples of constitutionally permissible pricefixing schemes. They represent in large measure a basic departure from the
philosophy and approach of the majority in the Ribnik case." 8 But it was argued
that the state of Nebraska had made no showing in this case that conditions existed which made it reasonably necessary to regulate the fees of private employment agencies in the interests of the public welfare, and that, on the contrary,
a state of competition existed which served to prevent extortion in the charging
of fees. To this argument the Court replied as follows: "We are not concerned,
however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice which 'should be left where .••
it was left by the Constit~tion-to the States and to Congress.' •.. There is no
necessity for the state to demonstrate before us that evils persist despite the
competition which attends the bargaining in this field. In final analysis, the only
constitutional prohibitions or restraints which respondents have suggested for the
invalidation of this legislation are those notions of public policy embedded in
2
State ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Assn. v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 293
N. W. 393 (1941).
3
291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
~ See the dissenting opinion of Justice Stone, concurred in by Justice Holmes and
Brandeis. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 at 359 et seq., 48 S. Ct. 545 (1928).
5
273 U. S. 418, 47 S. Ct. 426 (1927).
e 94 U. S. ll3 (1877).
7
See McAllister, "Lord Hale and Business Affected With a Public Interest,"
43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930).
8
313 U.S. at 245.
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earlier decisions of this Court but which, as Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, should not be read into the Constitution. • .• Since they do not find expression in the Constitution, we cannot give them continuing vitality as standards
by which the constitutionality of the economic and social programs of the states
is to be determined." 11 The significance of this language is that it seems to repudiate even the limited review of the N ebbia case by indicating that the questions of necessity and appropriateness of the legislation are none of the Court's
business. This seems to be but a way of saying that the Court will not review
the reasonableness of the ends or of the means employed. That this is the meaning
intended seems clear when consideration is given the statement that notions of
public policy are not imbedded in the Constitution. This is a restatement of
Justice Holmes' more pungent expression that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. 10 In short, the presumption in favor
of freedom of contract under a laissez faire economy is no longer to be considered a starting point in the Court's reasoning. If the presumption in favor of
freedom of contract is abandoned, it follows naturally that there is no occasion
for passing upon the reasonableness of the legislation in its substantive aspects.
This not only goes beyond the Nebbia case but exceeds the liberalism of Justice
Brandeis and Chief Justice Stone expressed in earlier cases.11 The language
quoted also goes beyond the view stressed recently that legislation affecting economic interests will be presumed valid in the absence of a showing of unreasonableness.12 Justice Douglas' opinion indicates a complete lack of constitutional
11

Id. 246-247.
Expressed in his dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 at 75, 25
S. Ct. 539 (1905).
11
"The limitation is that set by the due process clause, which, as construed, requires that the regulation shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious; and that
the means of regulation selected shall have a real or substantial relation to the object
sought to be obtained. • •• In my opinion, the true principle is that the State's power
extends to every regulation of any business reasonably required and appropriate for the
public protection." Justice Brandeis dissenting (italics added) in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 at 302-303, 52 S. Ct. 371 (1932).
"It is undoubtedly true as a general proposition that one of the incidents of the
ownership of property is the power to fix the price at which it may be disposed. It
may also be assumed that as a general proposition, under the decisions of this Court,
the power of state governments to regulate and control prices may be invoked only in
special and not well defined circumstances." Justice Stone dissenting in Tyson &
Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 at 450, 47 S. Ct. 426 (1927).. See also his statement
referred to in note I 2, infra.
12 "We may assume for present purposes that no pronouncement of a legislature
can forestall attack upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by
applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act, and that o statute would deny due
process which precluded the disproof in judicial proceeding of all facts which, would
show or tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had
a rational basis.
"But such we think is not the purpose or construction of the statutory characterization of filled milk as injurious to health and as a fraud upon the public. There is no
need to consider it here as more than a declaration of the legislative findings deemed
to support and justify the action taken as a constitutional exertion of the legislative
power, aiding informed judicial review, as do the reports of legislative committees, by
10
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foundation for the assertion of private right under the due process clause where
contractual or proprietary interests are involved.13 How widely this extreme
view is shared by other members of the Court remains to be seen.

1

Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1937), Act 143a (Stat. 1933, p. 1969; as amended

by Stat. 1935, pp. 1586, 2087).
2 Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 57 S. Ct. 842 (1937); California v.
Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930 (1941).
3 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U. S.
210, 52 S. Ct. 559 (1932).
4 Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 35 S. Ct. 501 (1915).
5 Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 43 S. Ct. 526 (1923); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524 (1937); Ford Motor Co. v.
Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 273 (1939); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 60 S. Ct. 388 (1940).

